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and
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The phenomenon of corporate diversification in the 1960's and 1970's
has raised a debate about the effects of diversification on the performance
of the firm. On one end of the spectrum, there is the view that the diversi-
fied company, while adding little or no value to its individual business
units, creates the potential for a wide variety of anticompetitive practices
such as reciprocity and predatory cross subsidization, and increases the ag-
gregate concentration of economic power. The opposite view holds that
diversification has some decided advantages, relating in large part to its
managerial properties. The diversified firm is said to allow for desirable
2
spreading of risk, to allocate capital internally more efficiently than the
external capital markets do, and to bring to bear sophisticated, detached
and unbiased management supervision on business entities where managerial
3
slack would allow management inefficiency to survive indefinitely. Evidence
of the hypothetical undesirable practices described above, according to those
4
who hold this view, is lacking.
One central consequence of diversification that bears directly on these
issues is a fundamental change in the nature of "regulation" of the individual
business unit operating in a particular industry. Diversification means that
the regulation of such business units either partially or totally passes from
"purely" market mechanisms to the corporate office of the diversified corpora-
tion, which attempts to regulate business units through a set of administrative
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procedures. While some of the debate about diversification has dealt implic-
itly with the consequences of this shift, it is clearly quite central to as-
sessing the proposed managerial advantages of diversification and thus a more
complete examination is in order. This shift in the nature of regulation also
carries implications for competition in individual industries which need to be
examined.
The purpose of the exploratory paper is to:
I. Examine in a tentative way some characteristics and possible conse-
quences of the shift to administrative regulation of the business
unit, with special emphasis on how these differ from market regula-
tion of the independent firm.
II. Draw some possible implications of administrative regulation for
resource allocation and other strategic decisions of the firm, as
well as assess the possible impact of such regulation on some other
aspects of firm behavior.
III. Explore some of the most likely consequences overtime, of adminis-
trative regulation for the characteristics of the diversified firm's
portfolio of business.
IV. Examine the dynamics of competition in a mixed industry, or the
industry composed of both independent entities regulated by the
market and entities regulated through administrative mechanisms.
While we can only raise questions rather than provide answers in view
of the myriad of administrative arrangements that are actually observed in
place of diversified companies, our analysis will suggest some doubts about
the unqualified attainment of the proposed managerial benefits of diversifica-
tion, and raise some implications for the management of the diversified firm.
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For purposes of this paper we examine the case of the diversified firm
where no operational synergies exist among business units in the portfolio
of businesses held by the corporate parent. That is, while there may be
purely financial benefits to the portfolio, the non-capital costs of the
individual business units are unaffected by their joint presence in the
portfolio. While this assumption restricts our attention to what is com-
monly called the pure conglomerate, it allows us to concentrate our atten-
tion on the managerial implications of diversification alluded to earlier
and is in practice probably a reasonable assumption for many large diversi-
fied firms. Relaxing the assumption would complicate the exposition of
our argument, but would not change the basic conclusions.
I. Administrative Regulation Versus Market Regulation
Let us now examine how administrative regulation of the business
unit differs from market regulation. In market regulation, major pricing,
promotion, resource allocation and other key business decisions are made
by the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the independent business unit on
the advice and counsel of his senior subordinates. The consequences of
those decisions are evaluated through the subtle operation of the product
market mechanism, which determines the short and long term financial re-
turns for the independent company. Capital for investment purposes comes
from two primary sources. First, it is generated internally in amounts
depending on the financial results of the firm. Second, it can be raised
on the external debt or equity capital markets, based on their evaluation
of the future of the firm, which is usually strongly influenced by the
performance of other firms in its industry.
The CEO is at the top of the organization both in decisionmaking and
career terms, and by definition can aspire to no higher position within
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the organization. He and his subordinates are intimately familiar with
the business and its characteristics, possessing extensive information
and experience about it. Any information, reporting and control sys-
tems are in place to serve the CEO's needs in managing the particular
business. While planning and forecasts are part of the management pro-
cess, they are used as a management tool and the CEO is well aware of
the uncertainties involved.
It is hard to generalize about how the CEO's salary is set, but
it is undoubtedly influenced by the level of salaries paid by other
firms of comparable size and by the general performance of the firm
as compared to that of others in its industry. As for the performance
itself, it is based on both short-run results and longer term, more
intangible factors. Since the CEO usually has played a major role in
selecting the Board, it may well be sympathetic to evaluating his per-
formance and in any event is knowledgeable about the business as a re-
sult of its association with the firm. In fact the literature on take-
overs suggests that there is a great deal of slack before poor results
o
are translated into the wrestling of control from present management.
In administrative regulation
,
pricing, promotion, resource alloca-
tion and other key decisions are made by the head of the business unit,
who we call the Division General Manager (DGM) , again with advice from
his senior subordinates. However, these decisions are reviewed (in
most cases formally) by one or more layers of corporate management
9
superimposed over the DGM. For simplicity, we will refer to the entire
structure of corporate management as the Corporate Chief Executive Offi-
cer (CCEO). Providing review of major divisional decisions is a major
element of the job of the CCEO. The CCEO also allocates capital, hires
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and fires divisional management and sets their compensation. The DGM's
hope is to become corporate management if they are successful.
Perhaps the central characteristic of corporate review is that the
CCEO does not possess detailed and complete knowledge of the character-
istics and ongoing status of the individual business units under his
supervision. This is not a failing of the CCEO, but simply a reflection
of the fact that he has multiple business units to review, is not actively
managing all these business units on a day to day basis, and has bounded
rationality (or is limited in time and cognition). This basic inability
to know each business intimately has led to the common adoption of the
divisionalized or profit center organizational structure in the diversi-
fied firm, where the CCEO delegates much of the day to day decisionmaking
authority to division management who possess the relevant information.
Coupled with decentralization, however, is the institution of formal
or quasi-formal corporate planning, budgeting, resource allocation, informa-
tion and control systems. The latter provide the CCEO with selected
measures for assessing the performance of divisions, give the divisions a
common format for seeking capital and enable the CCEO to review what each
division plans to do. These systems, usually standardized across divi-
sions, are designed to give the CCEO that portion of information (from
the very wide range of information the DGM possesses) he needs to review
divisional decisions, in a consistent form to allow for more effective
use and comparability. Since financial data often provide the only comon
denominator across divisions, these corporate systems are usually heavily
financial in nature. In fact, the more diversified the firm the greater
the likelihood for the review and control to be heavily financial In
nature, and the more separated by layers of management the CCEO Ik from
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DGMs. In addition to review, corporate management sets incentives for
DGMs , again often based on a common system applied to all divisions.
The decisions of the DGM, ratified or altered by corporate manage-
ment, are evaluated by the product market in much the same way as in
the case of the independent firm, and short and long-term financial
results are returned. Unlike the independent firm, however, capital
resources are allocated to the division based on decisions of corporate
management. They may bear no relation (in either direction) to the
funds generated internally by the division, nor necessarily to what
the external capital markets would have allocated to the division based
on its performance were it a free-standing company. Capital allocation
by corporate management necessarily involves a comparison among divisions
which are in most cases heterogeneous, few of a kind to prevent normaliza-
tion and in situations where capital resources are limited.
The DGM under administrative regulation, then, operates under a dual
set of masters. He owes allegiance to the marketplace, which translates
his decisions into financial results in the short and long term. However,
he also owes allegiance to the administrative structure within which he
operates. This structure has its own set of rules about what and how he
is to be measured and compensated, and on the progress of his career.
Even putting his own short run career interest aside, this structure will
determine how much capital he receives to improve his business, and how
much effective authority he has in making decisions. It is a structure
which has an incomplete knowledge of his business and of the opportunities
and constraints under which he operates. As a result, it is a structure
that measures performance and potential with a limited and incomplete
number of indicators, and where measures and measurements may be averaged
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and applied uniformly to the whole portfolio of businesses. As we have
already intimated and even if the CCEO wanted to apply standards of
global rationality in the processes of review, evaluation and alloca-
tion of resources, to the extent that his portfolio includes heterogen-
eous entities, it is very unlikely that he can approach the rationality
the markets impose on the independent firms of the industries represented
in the portfolio. The process of averaging coupled with incomplete in-
formation will invariably cause distortions.
It would be surprising if the presence of this other structure did
not affect the decisions of the DGM. Bower's (1970) intensive clinical
study of capital budgeting decisions in large diversified companies illus-
trates persuasively, and so does Ackerman's work (1968), that what we have
called here an administrative structure does make a difference. Bower
and Ackerman both indeed find that the corporate "context," or the array
of systems in place in the organization, fundamentally affect the type of
capital budgeting proposals initiated and presented to top management.
Our task, then, is to examine how the administrative structure will affect
the behavior of the division of the diversified company as compared to
that of the independent firm.
II. Administrative Regulation and Decisionmaking at the Divisional Level
Conceptually, administrative regulation could affect business unit
decisions in two ways. It could alter the opportunity set facing the
DGM as compared to the CEO of the independent firm, or it could affect
the decisionmaking (or maximization) processes the DGM applies to the
opportunity set vis-a-vis that which the CEO applies. While the re-
sources of the diversified firm might indeed change the opportunity
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set facing the DGM, we will assume here that the opportunity sets or
range of strategies facing the DGM and CEO are the same, so that we
may examine how the DGM operating under administrative regulation is
likely to choose among those strategies as compared to the CEO of the
independent firm.
The allocation of internal capital and the rewards and punishments
applied to a DGM are determined by the administrative system or "rules
of the game" described earlier, while external factors dominate both
capital allocation and rewards and punishments for the CEO of the in-
dependent firm. As noted earlier, the internal measurement system is
based on an inherently limited set of measures while the external eval-
uation of the independent firm by the product and capital markets is
longer term and more subtle and multidimensional. Thus utility maxi-
mizing behavior for DGMs will likely diverge from that of CEOs.
Managers operating under administrative regulation will seek to
understand the rules of the game set by that regulation and adapt their
behavior accordingly. If they are successful, or "have a good track
record," corporate management will rarely overturn their decisions.
Top management will not get the chance to choose directly, but rather
will be faced with very "good" proposals because of prescreening pro-
cesses based on the DGM's "reading" of the administrative system, or,
relatedly, must let proposals reaching them pass by default due to lack
of information. A supporting point is that lack of time and information
usually prevents top management from seeing alternative proposals for a
given business decision, but rather an individual proposal it must either
accept, reject or modify. The tradeoffs involved in selecting the "best"
alternative are made at lower levels.
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The observation that proposals to top management are rarely turned
down is supported by Bower's work, which found that very few capital re-
quests that actually reached top management were denied. Similarly,
few long-range plans are not accepted, and arguments over annual budgets
tend to occur within fairly narrow ranges. Hence in examining the im-
plications of administrative regulation, we must place a major focus on
the decisions of the DGM and not the CCEO. While it is not possible to
generalize completely, in view of the differences among diversified com-
panies in the manner in which the administrative structure operates, we
can highlight some potential areas of divergence between the division
and the independent company which may occur.
A. Strategic Choices
Both the DGM and the CEO continuously face a range of strategic
alternatives that can be arrayed by expected payoff, risk, time pat-
tern of inflows and outflows (including their regularity), etc.
They also face a set of alternatives with analagous characteristics
when considering reactions to external disturbances or to competitors'
strategic moves. The DGM will have more complete information on the
opportunity set available than corporate management does, as well as
better information about the reasons why opportunities may or may not
be realized both ex ante and ex poste. In addition to the problem of
limits on the quantity of information there also exists the potential
problem of information impactedness that has recently been explored
in the literature on organization theory, product choice and fraud.
While the DGM may know the true probabilities of alternative outcomes
occurring as a result of strategy choices, or at least have the best
estimates of these in the corporation, it is extremely difficult for
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him to communicate these credibly to his superiors. The latter may
see his estimates of the true probabilities of downside events as
overly pessimistic to protect his position, and his estimates of
the true probability of upside outcomes of proposed strategic choices
as overly optimistic to get his plans approved. Thus even though
both the DGM and CCEO might benefit from communicating the "truth,"
this is difficult to achieve. No such problems or much less of a
problem exists for the CEO, who needs no approval for strategic
choices.
In view of the informational differences between administrative
regulation and market regulation, we might expect them to be reflected
in strategic choices by the DGM that are different than those of the
CEO in a number of respects:
1. Strategy Choices With Shorter Time Horizon for Achieving Results :
In the presence of incomplete measurement by the corporate
office, there is a tendency for the time horizon of the DGM to
13be shorter than that of the CEO. He is less likely to make
choices which will take a long period to be reflected in results,
or which build goodwill, than the CEO, because corporate manage-
ment's poorer information and the problem of information impacted-
ness makes it difficult for them to understand and accept his
justification that the future will show the necessary benefits
14
of present sacrifices. Further, the normal review period for
the plans and the results of operation for the CEO is quarterly
or possibly annually, while frequently monthly reviews are held
by the CCEO for his DGMs. Adopting strategies which require
short-run sacrifices invites questions and interference by well-
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meaning top management, while strategies with lower returns
but quicker results may bring praise and autonomy.
The tendency towards strategies with short feedback is
reinforced by the DGM's need to compete for capital on a year
by year basis with other units in the corporation (unlike the
independent firm which can operate on a less regular and con-
strained schedule). The DGM, needing to win continued capital
investments in the annual corporate-wide competition for capi-
tal, will often be under pressure to show some promising results
from year to year to secure this allocation. There is also the
possibility, that has been noted by many, that the DGM will get
promoted elsewhere before the results of long-term actions are
registered, and he may adopt strategies with short-run payoffs
to facilitate his rapid advancement. Another often noted force
working in this direction is for the measurement and incentive
system stressing single measures of performance, such as ROI,
to place emphasis on short-term performance. While shorter-
time horizon strategies may not always be adopted by divisions as
compared to the independent firms, the pressures are evidently there.
Less Willingness to Adopt Risky Strategies :
When one considers the implications of the administrative
structure described above, it may well be that the DGM is willing
to take less risk in strategic choices than the CEO of the inde-
pendent firm. The DGM is continuously measured and rewarded on
the basis of mainly financial results, and seeks approval and
advancement from corporate management. Despite the ability of
the diversified corporation as a whole to withstand failures, it
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is extremely difficult to shield the DGM from the adverse
affects of a prudently attempted move which results in
failure.
The cause is a variant of the informational problems
described above. It is hard for the DGM to communicate
credibly and on an ex ante basis accurate probabilities of
failure of risky strategies. Ex post, his explanation can
be read as excuses, and failures interpreted as the lack of
trying hard enough to implement effective strategies. In
this environment, failure is often very costly to the DGM.
Failure reduces the DGM's chances for advancement, and reduces
his future credibility in securing internal capital (including
that capital which he is generating internally in his own div-
ision). Although his direct superiors at the time may under-
stand and accept the failure as the consequence of a prudently
taken risky decision that was implemented as effectively as
possible, this information is difficult to communicate to
others in the organization and to successive superiors. Even
one failure can become a semi-permanent and often intangible
blemish on a manager's record, affecting him adversely in his
dealings with others in the organization.
Stating these arguments more formally, the DGM will be
risk-averse relative to the CEO because the penalty for failure
he faces is greater. It can also be argued that the DGM is less
likely than the CEO to capture the rents of a "big win," given
his difficulty in communicating true probabilities of success
ex ante. With full blame for failures and less than full credit
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for successes, risk aversion may well result. The CCEO cannot
force the DGM to take appropriate risks because the CCEO does
not know the opportunity set facing the DGM. Thus although the
CEO of an independent firm will not likely risk bankruptcy, he
may well be more willing to risk small or modest failures than
the DGM.
These arguments raise a paradox. We noted earlier that one
of the potential benefits of the diversified firm was a greater
ability to take risks, and the diversified firm may indeed have
the resources available to bear greater prudent business risks.
Looking at the consequences of administrative regulation, however,
there are some plausible conditions under which the opposite be-
havior may be expected from the strategic decisionmaker, the DGM.
While this will not necessarily hold in all cases, some forces
working in this direction are evidently present that must be
overcome if the benefits of diversification for risk-taking are
to be realized.
Greater Propensity to Adopt Strategies that Have Predictable
Outcomes and are Readily Explainable :
Corporate management's incomplete information coupled with
their frequent review of the DGM suggest that the DGM may be
more likely to emphasize strategic choices whose future results
are predictable than the CEO. He may also be more likely than
the CEO to choose strategies for which the justification for
making the choice is explainable in simple, intuitive, logical
terms, rather than by arguments resting on faith, on the ability
to create or innovate, on intuitions about industry changes or
on competitive moves.
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The CCEO will have an inevitable tendency to evaluate
DGMs on whether there were "no surprises," whether they
"delivered" on their promises, and on the degree to which
their plans and expectations about future outcomes proved
to be accurate. While such criteria have their merits in
evaluating managers, because of incomplete information, the
CCEO finds it difficult to separate unplanned outcomes which
arose because of poor planning from those that occurred be-
cause of legitimate market uncertainties. If this separation
cannot be made, the DGM will be pushed to adopt strategies
which have lower expected profit outcomes but which have future
consequences that are easy to predict. That is to say, he pre-
fers the lower profit level because of the lower variance. A
reinforcing tendency is created by CCEO's role in monitoring
divisional performance on an ongoing basis. In this capacity
the CCEO can potentially make the DGM uncomfortable with scrutiny,
questioning, and potential interference in decisionmaking (reduc-
tion in autonomy) if unpredictable and unplanned events occur.
Finally, depending on the nature of the corporate incentive sys-
tem, unplanned adverse outcomes may hurt the DGM's compensation
which he cannot recover through unplanned positive outcomes. The
DGM who selects a strategy with predictable results that actually
occur according to plan, raises the confidence of corporate man-
agement in him. This credibility may boost his chances in the
race for corporate capital, and allow him to manage his business
free from intervention.
In the same vein, as the predictability in outcomes, is the
explainability of strategy choices in simple logical terms. While
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the CEO does not have to articulate the reasons for his choices
to imperfectly informed "outsiders," the DGM does. To fulfill
their role as reviewers, corporate management will insist on
explanations for critical choices, and will be likely to accept
only explanations they can understand. These may well be ex-
planations that rest on specific data and are logically appealing,
and which do not rely on highly specialized technical knowledge,
on judgments, instincts or "feel," despite the fact that these
may be wholly accurate. Furthermore the "chances" the DGM takes
will have to be explainable in financial terms while the CEO may
have more leeway in adopting strategies that cannot be justified
solely in financial terms especially in the short run.
Less Weight on Psychic or Professional Payoffs Versus Financial
Payoffs in Strategy Choices :
The greater emphasis on strategies that can be explained in
financial terms and the separation between corporate management
and the business, suggest that less weight may be placed on psychic
or professional payoffs by a DGM in his strategic choices than by
a CEO. Staying in a particular geographic area of community,
maintaining technological leadership (even if it does maximize
long run profits) and other factors which offer psychic rewards
to managers will inevitably be valued less by a central and
"foreign" management not intimately involved in the business.
Thus a division will be less likely to value these sorts of
nonprofit-maximizing payoffs in strategic choices which often
seems very important to the independent firm, or saying it another
way, division management will probably have fewer non-financial
arguments in their utility functions.
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B. Implications for Innovation
The aforementioned observations as a group carry some potential
implications for innovation by divisions of diversified firms relative
to independent companies. We have identified pressures on the division
of the diversified company which may make it less willing to engage in
risky research and development, less likely to introduce or even later
adopt radical innovations, which may increase the variance in the plans,
although the expected profits and duration of such may increase, and
less likely to make major changes in strategic positioning than the
18
independent firm, other things being equal. These same forces sug-
gest that the division might also be less creative and pioneering in
its strategic choices generally than independent firms.
Once again, then, we have a paradox between the potential benefits
of diversification and an administrative analysis of the incentives
facing the decisionmaker. Forces are present which operate against
innovation in the division, requiring countervailing forces if the
diversified firm is to realize its potential in nurturing innovative
activity.
III. Administrative Regulation and the Business Portfolio
A. Investment
Administrative regulation replaces market allocation of capital
with an internal capital allocation process. While market allocation
is based on a subtle and multidimensional set of market outcomes, ad-
20
ministrative capital allocation may not be. A consequence of cor-
porate management's incomplete information about each individual bus-
iness and the absence of many homogeneous entities for comparability,
is that it may be unable to fully discern differences in risk among
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investments in different divisions. Impacted information complicates
the assessment of true risk, and we have described above some reasons
why risk may be underestimated. These and other characteristics of
administrative regulation have implications for how capital is allocated
from the corporation to divisions relative to allocations from the mar-
ket to free-standing companies, and how the portfolio of businesses in
the diversified firm may develop over time.
The most basic difference between capital allocation in the division
relative to the free-standing firm is that the division will inevitably
be judged against other units in its diversified parent, while the free-
standing firm has sure access to at least its internally generated funds
and its external funds requests are judged against the general popula-
tion of firms. Take the case of two divisions of similar riskiness and
facing similar opportunity sets. The division lodged in a parent com-
pany with several "better" performing divisions which are ravenous
consumers of capital will likely get less capital than the same divi-
sion in a parent with other divisions in a capital generating mode.
That is, the opportunity cost of capital for the particular diversi-
fied firm, and hence its hurdle rate for internal investments in a
division, may be greatly different from the opportunity cost of cap-
ital accorded by the external capital markets to the free-standing
firm in the same industry as the division even if the division and
free-standing firm are equally risky. The capital may be over or
under supplied to the division relative to the free-standing firm,
and also relative to the socially optional level. Thus the capital
investment choices of a division are much more dependent on its
specific ownership situation than those of the free-standing firm.
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If corporate management cannot fully discern ex ante differ-
ences in risk among the capital investment proposals of its divi-
sions, and each division is not assured of even its internally
generated funds but depends on the outcome of the corporate capi-
tal allocation procedure, what might some of the consequences be
for the behavior of the portfolio of businesses in the diversified
company over time? To examine this question, let us make the ex-
treme assumption that because of incomplete and impacted information,
corporate management cannot perceive ex ante the risk differences
among divisions at all, and assigns a single hurdle rate for invest-
ments qualifying for corporate capital. This simplifies understanding
of the effects to be described, but formally, any underestimate in
the perception of risk differences is sufficient to lead to the con-
clusions reached. Let us further assume that businesses with higher
risk tend to have higher expected rates of return and also have more
high return investment projects than lower risk businesses. Finally,
we assume that the high risk/high return businesses tend to be earlier
in their life cycle, and thus have a greater net appetite for capital
than the lower risk businesses.
Under the circumstances we have posited, corporate capital will
be allocated to the high risk businesses and not to the lower return,
lower risk businesses. The single hurdle rate, set at the opportunity
cost of capital for the firm, will insure this result. Unsupported by
capital investment, the performance of lower risk businesses will
deteriorate as will their cash generating ability. And even if these
units do not initially deteriorate, they will contract relative to
the high-risk units, and their relative importance within the firm
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diminish. Reduced cash generation accentuates their starvation,
because even less capital is available to them after allocation
to the high risk businesses. Eventually the lower risk businesses
become candidates for liquidation. Liquidating them raises the
hurdle rate even more, further accelerating the flow of capital
to the higher risk divisions.
Over time, then, the diversified firm will be starved of in-
vestment funds by weeding out the capital generators in the port-
folio, and will increase the overall risk in the business portfolio.
In the limit, this will result in bankruptcy of the firm because
the subsidized risky divisions will be unable to absorb their long
run costs once the less risky businesses have been eliminated. In
practice, bankruptcy is unlikely to result but rather a cyclical
phenomenon in corporate investment behavior will be observed. Once
the dynamic escalation in risk results in capital constraints and
sporadic failures, the corporate office is likely to intervene and
radically change corporate policies to emphasize internal capital
generation and risk reduction. That is, decision rules will shift
to reflect the desire to avoid the last disaster. Capital will be
denied higher risk divisions, and some may be divested, to restore
the parent's financial stability. Once financial stability is
regained, however, the same dynamic risk escalation may begin anew,
unless management fully appreciates the reasons behind these cyclical
patterns of behavior and develops a balanced approach to risk manage-
22
ment.
The single hurdle rate will also produce behavior at the division
level which will reinforce this dynamic result. Facing the single
overly high average cost of capital, low-risk divisions will set
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prices higher than otherwise, worsening their position vis-a-vis
free-standing firms and shrinking their capital needs. High-risk
divisions, conversely, will be misled by the cost of corporate
capital and will set prices lower than they would as free-standing
entities. This will increase their growth rates and market shares,
and increase their desire for capital to expand. It will also send
false signals (mounting orders, backlogs and delivery delays) to
corporate management about the underlying soundness of their business
23
strategies.
We have yet another apparent paradox as a result of these argu-
ments. In our dynamic model, the CCEO unknowingly acts like a risk
lover in stark contrast to our argument that the DGM may be more risk
averse than his counterpart in the independent firm. However, this
behavior is not contradictory. The DGM is more risk averse than the
CEO because of the greater penalty he pays if failure occurs. The
DGM has estimates of the probability of failure of alternative strat-
egies. Under the forces of administrative regulation, he will reduce
the risk of failure in his strategy as much as he can, given the nature
of the particular business , and still achieve satisfactory financial
results. Unless every DGM can eliminate all risks, however, there
will still be a portfolio of businesses facing the CCEO with different
risk/return combinations.
The CCEO acts like a risk lover because of his poor ex ante informa-
tion about the risk characteristics of each individual business. If
one of the businesses performs poorly, then the CCEO knows it ejc post
and penalizes the DGM. However, the CCEO does not know the a priori
probability that each business will experience a failure and thus is
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likely to overpenalize the DGM. Thus the different behavior
towards risk of the two levels of management is a reflection
primarily of the fact that the DGM knows the true prior proba-
bility of failure in his business better than the CCEO does.
B. Disinvestment ;
Administrative regulation alters the possibilities for
disinvestment by a business unit. For the independent firm,
the cost of disinvestment is extremely high. Disinvestment
requires either finding a new business area to invest in
(diversification), or returning capital to the shareholders
either gradually or in a lump sum through liquidation. A
variety of factors make these choices difficult for a CEO
25
to make. The market mechanism can refuse new capital to
a firm (both by reducing internal generations directly and by
limiting access to the capital markets) , but the market has
difficulty taking capital out of a firm except in extreme cases
of outright losses or takeovers.
Administrative regulation, on the other hand, cannot only
refuse capital to a division, but can also decide to take capital
out, either through liquidation or by means of an explicit strategy
of "milking" the division. It has the potential of being less af-
fected by emotional attachments to particular businesses, though in
26
practice this potential is not always realized. Thus administra-
tive regulation may well facilitate economically appropriate disin-
vestment relative to disinvestment in free-standing firms. It is
likely to also facilitate changes in poorly performing management,
for similar reasons. Under the assumptions of our dynamic model
above, this facilitated disinvestment can accentuate the difficulties
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in risk balancing of the portfolio. It can also, however, result
in social benefits in cases where a division is earning truly sub-
normal returns.
IV. Competition in the Mixed" Industry
After the extensive diversification of the 1960 's and 1970' s, many
industries in the U.S. economy have become "mixed" industries composed
of both free-standing firms and divisions of diversified companies. How
might our analysis of the consequences of administrative regulation be
reflected in the patterns of competition in such industries?
Since administrative regulation may affect strategy choices, the
first implication of our analysis is that the competitive strategies
of free-standing firms and divisions may well differ systematically
within an industry. The free-standing firms may be greater risk takers,
operate with longer time horizons, and be more creative strategically,
ceteris paribus. Administrative regulation potentially alters the goals
of divisions versus free-standing firms, and this is reflected in their
competitive behavior.
A second implication of our analysis follows from the discussion
regarding the diversified company portfolio. The division's competitive
behavior will be affected by the particular financial status of its cor-
porate siblings, while the independent firm is more dependent on capital
market evaluation relating to the characteristics of the particular busi-
ness. In addition, the division may be a more or less dangerous competitor
to the free-standing firm depending on the nature of the industry. In the
stable, mature industry, the division may be excessively starved for capi-
tal for the reasons discussed earlier. However, in the risky industry the
subsidized division may make "irrational" pricing and expansion decisions
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from the point of view of the free-standing firm because of its lower,
subsidized cost of capital. Thus such divisions may tend to grow faster
and may force the free-standing firm to adopt the relatively risky strat-
egies in the industry that the division will try to avoid. The division
will tend to adopt the least risky strategies possible in the risky in-
dustry given administrative regulation. In a cross section of industries,
we might expect to see divisions attain lower market shares and perhaps
higher profits than independents (because they will be harvesting) in
stable industries, and higher market shares but lower profits (due to
conservative strategies) than independent firms in risky industries,
other things being equal.
V. Summary and Implications
While it appears to facilitate the shifting of capital out of inef-
ficient units and the replacement of poor management, the properties of
administrative regulation raise questions about the achievement of many
of the supposed benefits of diversification, and create potential for
differences in the behavior of divisions of diversified firms and inde-
pendent firms. Though there are some arguments for why capital alloca-
tion may be facilitated, it can be also misallocated within the portfolio
of businesses in the diversified firm. Achievement of the potential ben-
efits of diversification in risk spreading and innovation faces the prob-
lem of overcoming forces working in the opposite direction. In fact, as
we have argued the opposite forces are likely to be dominant. And while
a dispassionate, professional review of division strategies by corporate
management may yield better strategic choices in some cases, incentives
are created in the process which may lead to suboptional strategy choices
from the point of view of the corporation.
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The differences between administrative and market regulation carry
possible implications for industry competition which have been discussed.
The use of a single hurdle rate of return for allocation of capital will
most likely encourage over expansion of the risky and contraction of the
low-risk divisions, possibly leading to excess capacity and lower prices
as compared to free-standing competitors in the case of the former, and
the opposite in the case of the latter divisions. The differences ob-
served also carry implications regarding the relations of the firm to
its suppliers and customers. Divisions and free-standing firms may well
have different propensities in accepting projects or signing contracts
with given time horizons and risk profiles. Similarly, when a free-stand-
ing firm becomes part of a diversified firm its strategy and its relations
with customers and suppliers may change in ways suggested in the discussion
above.
These consequences of administrative regulation raise a challenge to
the corporate management of the diversified firm. The challenge is to
find ways to eliminate the biases we have described. Some of the recom-
mendations flowing from our analysis are as follows. First, it may be
important to judge strategies and investment projects as total projects
and not on a "day by day" basis. Corporate review should be carried out
relative to the business plan and the expected level of predictability
that the plan calls for. Incentive and control system that measure only
financial performance should be supplemented by measurements which capture
long run changes in the total position of the business unit such as mar-
ket share, customer satisfaction and loyalty, changes in product quality,
changes in management and employee turnover.
In planning and capital budgeting systems, one may ask for alterna-
tive strategies which are more risky and less risky than the proposed
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strategy. This approach will improve choices by exposing the uncer-
tainties involved in the alternatives more fully and posing risk/return
tradeoffs to top management. Incentive systems should be designed with
enough flexibility so as not to discourage taking prudent risks and also
not discourage the sacrifice of short-run profits for longer-run projects
with appropriate higher returns. Finally, corporate management must strive
to create a climate where those responsible for failures resulting from
well planned and well executed decisions under uncertainty, are not pen-
alized and their careers as managers are not ruined. Implementing these
suggestions is no easy task, but doing so may offer benefits in the quality
of performance for the diversified firm and its component parts.
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